The Red Sea Blockade: A Strategic Weakness for the Israeli Enemy

The Red Sea has been a constant source of concern for the Zionist entity since its occupation of the Palestinian land in 1948.

This concern is evident in statements made by Zionist officials regarding the importance of Israeli navigation in the Red Sea. (Golda Meir), the foreign minister of the entity at the time, stated in a speech before the United Nations on March 1, 1957: “The freedom of maritime navigation for Israel in the Red Sea is a vital national interest for us.”

In 1949, the enemy’s so-called “army” occupied the Umm al-Rashrash region, giving the entity commercial and economic flexibility toward the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, especially after signing peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which ensured that the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, and the Suez Canal were no longer obstacles for the Zionist regime.

Historically, the closure of Zionist maritime routes in the Red Sea has been among the greatest economic disasters for the enemy. The Bab al-Mandab Strait remains one of the most critical strategic weak points for the Zionist entity, causing it significant losses. The ongoing threats to Israeli shipping lines in international waters of the Red Sea have been a persistent source of anxiety for Zionist officials.

A Strategic Weakness of the Enemy

One of the most notable instances of using the Bab al-Mandab Strait against Israel occurred when it was leveraged to blockade Israeli-bound ships in exceptional situations, creating ongoing fears for the Zionists. Among these incidents was an operation carried out by the Palestinian Liberation Front, in which an armed boat equipped with a bazooka struck the Liberian oil tanker Coral Sea, which was leased to transport oil to the Israeli Occupation. This attack deeply alarmed the Zionist entity, as nearly half of its oil supply came from Iran via the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the occupied port of Umm al-Rashrash. In response, the Israeli enemy began arming its oil tankers, with the commander of the entity’s naval force at the time stating: “Egypt’s control over the Suez Canal gives it only one key to the Red Sea, but the second key—the more strategically significant one—will be in our hands.”

The second major blockade against the Zionist entity occurred during the October War of 1973 when the passage of oil shipments to occupied Umm al-Rashrash through Bab al-Mandab was completely halted. This severed the Zionist occupation’s connections to East and South Africa as well as Southeast Asia, causing economic damage.

During this short war, the enemy’s so-called Defense Minister (Moshe Dayan) admitted the severity of the situation, telling an Israeli newspaper: “We expected the Egyptians in the Gulf of Aqaba, but they appeared in Bab al-Mandab. Once the war ends, we will do everything in our power to internationalize this passage or occupy it.”

Zionist Expansionist Ambitions in the Red Sea

Following the 1973 war, the Zionist entity intensified its efforts to establish influence in the Red Sea and to seize control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Zionist enemy attempted to take over several islands at the southern entrance of the Red Sea through direct occupation, purchase, or leasing. These included islands along the Eritrean coast—Dahlak, Halib, Fatima, Sanjean, and Demira—as well as islands off the Yemeni coast, including Zubair, Greater and Lesser Hanish, and Perim Island at the entrance of Bab al-Mandab.

The Israeli enemy also established maritime surveillance points on select islands to monitor Red Sea navigation along the shipping route from Bab al-Mandab to the port of occupied Umm al-Rashrash “Eilat”. Additionally, it sought to construct military air and naval bases in the southern Red Sea to enforce its control over the waters and airspace.

For years, the Zionist entity harbored ambitions of occupying Yemen’s Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands and sought to seize the towering Zubair Island—standing 650 meters above sea level—to install a radar base.

Israeli Fears Intensify After Yemen’s September 21 Revolution

After the victory of the September 21 Revolution in 2014, Israeli concerns regarding navigation in the Red Sea came to the forefront. Many Zionist officials expressed their deep apprehension over the impact of the revolution on Israeli maritime routes. In a speech before the U.S. Congress on March 4, 2015, Zionist Prime Minister Netanyahu stated: “Hezbollah and the Houthis pose a grave threat to Israel’s security and stability.” This statement came just 23 days before the announcement of the Saudi-led coalition’s war on Yemen.

In another statement, Netanyahu said: “We are deeply concerned about what is happening in Yemen—the Houthis’ control over vast areas of the country and their continued advance toward the strategically vital Bab al-Mandab Strait, which plays a key role in global oil transit.”

A Decisive Moment for Israel in the Red Sea

From the above, it is clear that the Red Sea is of paramount importance to the Zionist entity’s strategy. Any disruption of Israeli maritime navigation in this crucial waterway could ignite a war, as the temporary entity cannot withstand a blockade. The Zionists have faced painful experiences with maritime sieges, including the Yemeni blockade during the al-Aqsa Flood battle, which was the most extensive, prolonged, and severe blockade the enemy has ever faced. Even the U.S., through its so-called Prosperity Guardian coalition, failed to lift the Yemeni blockade on the Israeli enemy.

Therefore, Sayyid Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s recent warning—giving a four-day ultimatum for lifting the siege on Gaza or facing renewed Yemeni operations in the Red Sea—is not merely a media stunt or a political maneuver. Rather, it is a serious and credible threat backed by Yemen’s demonstrated capabilities.

This Yemeni warning strikes at the Israeli enemy’s most sensitive weak point. The Zionist entity fully understands the consequences of a blockade in the Red Sea—it simply cannot endure such a measure. Thus, it is not far-fetched that the enemy may yield to this ultimatum and facilitate aid entry under any pretext, as Yemen holds a powerful and strategically significant leverage over the Israeli enemy.

However, should the enemy opt for the second course of action—refusing to lift the siege—the repercussions will be severe, potentially triggering a wider and more intense regional war. The new U.S. administration appears inclined toward such an escalation, but this gamble would come at an exorbitant cost for both the Americans and the Zionists.