Ansarollah Website Official Report
Published: Rajab 25, 1447 AH
The roles played by Saudi Arabia, the tasks assigned to it, and the diversity of its external relations continue to evolve. Yet despite these changes, the Kingdom remains constrained by U.S. hegemony, on which it relies completely in the security sphere. With the United States altering its national security strategy, Riyadh’s importance to Washington has not diminished; rather, the roles expected of it have changed. This raises a fundamental question: can Saudi Arabia succeed in keeping pace with the new American preferences, particularly when the United States itself has not decisively settled on empowering the Kingdom to fully perform these roles?
The American research paper titled “Bridging the Institutional Gap in Trump’s Middle East Strategy,” published on December 18, 2025, by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and authored by Elizabeth Dent and Ambassador Dennis Ross, constitutes a revealing document that sheds light on ongoing debates within research and advisory circles close to decision-making centers in Washington.
The original paper offers a functional diagnosis of an internal American dilemma related to the United States’ capacity to implement its strategic shift in the Gulf region—from direct military presence to managing influence through technological, economic, and institutional tools—with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
The importance of this American paper stems from the identities of its authors and the standing of the institution that issued it. It belongs to a school of thought that has actively participated in shaping U.S. policies toward the region and now seeks to assess the effectiveness of the American state’s own executive tools, rather than merely offering abstract theoretical recommendations.
This analysis comes as a reading of the original American paper to extract its strategic implications, within the context of an ongoing Saudi aggression and an existing strategic rivalry with Yemen.
The paper under review reflects a U.S. repositioning in the region that reduces the costs of direct military presence in favor of managing influence through economic and technological tools and supply chains. This shift should not be understood as a withdrawal from or abandonment of the region, but rather as a reconfiguration of mechanisms of hegemony that ensures the continuation of American superiority while reducing direct political and military risks. The authors’ acknowledgment of an “institutional gap” between strategic ambition and executive tools reveals that Washington views this path of changing the mechanisms of dominance and the nature of relationships as an urgent necessity, yet one that is not fully prepared. This renders the transitional phase sensitive and susceptible to instability under pressure.
The paper demonstrates a transition in U.S.–Saudi relations from the framework of a “security ally” to that of a “functional partner” within systems of technology, investment, energy, and minerals. The announced agreements—covering artificial intelligence, semiconductors, sovereign investment, civilian nuclear energy, and critical minerals—establish a form of mutual dependence. However, this dependence is regulated and subject to controls over Saudi access to these technologies and increasing American institutional oversight. In this sense, Saudi Arabia is not granted full technological sovereignty, but rather operates within frameworks that ensure Washington retains control over how these capabilities are used. This reflects an imbalance in the relationship in favor of the United States: Saudi Arabia seeks to compensate for its security gaps through technological and economic integration within an American-centered framework, rather than by building independent capabilities. Here, the difference between Saudi and American policies becomes evident in the provision of technologies and economic cooperation.
Artificial intelligence and semiconductors occupy a central position in this transformation. Export controls are shifting from the old logic of preventing Saudi Arabia’s access to these technologies to a new logic of permitting access while restricting Saudi freedom in their use. This establishes a pattern of constrained sovereignty: ownership of infrastructure without full control over operation, data, and models. American concern centers on the possibility that these technologies could leak to its adversaries, as well as on ensuring the superiority of American companies and the Zionist ally.
The original paper acknowledges that current screening mechanisms, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), assess individual transactions but do not measure long-term cumulative exposure, creating a regulatory gap amid massive investment flows. This acknowledgment carries two implications: first, that the influence of Gulf capital within the American economy has become a matter of institutional concern; and second, that U.S. decision-making will remain torn between attracting Saudi capital and containing its risks. In the context of a prolonged conflict, this tension could turn into a point of mutual leverage and weaken the cohesion of U.S. decisions regarding technological cooperation with Saudi Arabia if economic interests clash with security and political considerations.
The nuclear proposal relies on managing sensitive issues rather than resolving them, by postponing matters such as enrichment and full independence in the fuel cycle through long-term arrangements that go beyond the logic of traditional nonproliferation agreements. This approach links the (hypothetical) Saudi nuclear program to an American technological and operational structure encompassing fuel supply, operation, maintenance, and safety systems. Such linkage creates a dependence on the United States, making any Saudi move to impose full sovereignty over its nuclear program economically costly and politically fraught for bilateral relations. This vision rests on the assumption that such costs will deter any future Saudi inclination toward an independent nuclear program. However, historical experience indicates the fragility of this bet, as changes in regional balances or a decline in security guarantees could prompt a reassessment of these costs. As a result, the nuclear cooperation issue remains deferred for the time being and subject to ongoing discussions and negotiations between the two sides.
The paper highlights critical minerals as a fundamental element of advanced technologies and the energy transition, amid U.S. efforts to reduce dependence on China across the entire production chain, from extraction to processing and intermediate manufacturing. Integrating Saudi Arabia into this sector would effectively position the Kingdom as a primary manufacturing base for the United States, creating a new relationship of mutual dependence in which Washington relies on Riyadh. This policy aims to diversify sources and reduce risks, but at the same time introduces potential vulnerabilities stemming from supply bottlenecks—whether due to Saudi Arabia’s inability to meet American demand, delays in access, or disruptions in shipping—especially given that the Kingdom is situated in a complex geopolitical environment.
Washington is reshaping its influence through economic and technological tools that entail lower military costs, yet this approach remains incomplete, making it vulnerable to disruption under Yemeni security pressure at any time. Saudi Arabia—positioned as a functional partner rather than an independent pole—is becoming increasingly dependent on American systems that subordinate it structurally. Within this framework, the value of Yemeni deterrence rises.
This shift points to a declining capacity for Saudi Arabia to achieve decisive outcomes through traditional military means in its aggression against Yemen, and to an increasing Saudi reliance, in its strategic competition with the states of the Arabian Peninsula and the region, on indirect tools. The weight of modern technology and supply chains is growing in Saudi calculations, rendering maritime stability, energy, and trade factors of security pressure not only on Saudi Arabia but also on the United States, which is supposed to rely on the Kingdom as a manufacturing base for America. Moreover, the American acknowledgment of its own institutional gap means that decision-making will remain slow and fragmented among U.S. institutions, and more susceptible to political, media, and congressional pressure.
Semiconductors are solid materials (such as silicon and germanium) whose electrical properties fall between conductors (such as copper) and insulators (such as glass). Their conductivity can be controlled by adjusting factors such as temperature or by adding impurities, a process known as doping. These materials form the basis of electronic chip manufacturing, which powers everything from smartphones to computers, amplifies and switches signals, and converts energy, making semiconductors vital to modern technology and artificial intelligence.
