The security system in the Gulf region was formed to regulate energy flows, ensure market stability, and protect the conditions necessary for reproducing Western dominance over the global economy. Central to this framework was the linkage established by America between the dollar and oil, effectively obliging countries worldwide to purchase oil in dollars—thus allowing American monetary expansion to continue generating wealth.

Recent developments indicate that this economic-security function is no longer being performed with the same efficiency. The system designed to manage risks now appears increasingly incapable of addressing them, placing Gulf states in an unprecedented structural dilemma.

The Gulf Security System as a Mechanism for Regulating Flows

The Gulf security system took shape in the 1970s within the broader reorganization of the global economy following the oil shock of that decade. America directly linked regional security to energy security, not merely as a foreign policy choice but as part of restructuring the global capitalist system. This included ensuring controlled oil flows at manageable prices, cementing the dollar as the central currency for energy pricing, and securing vital maritime routes essential for global trade.

Within this framework, the system was not built as an equal defensive alliance among independent actors. Rather, it functioned as an arrangement serving imperial interests. American military presence was established through bases and operational infrastructure enabling rapid intervention, while Gulf militaries were integrated into Western arms and technology systems that limited their defensive autonomy. Security was also tied to the global economic structure, making the stability of Gulf states part of the stability of the internationally controlled market.

Thus, the system fulfilled a dual function: ensuring uninterrupted energy flows from the Gulf to Western and industrial Asian economies, and preventing the emergence of regional forces capable of influencing or disrupting these flows. It also confronted nationalist and popular liberation movements seeking sovereignty over land and waters in the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea, including opposition to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This made the American military presence part of a broader mechanism of global dominance rather than a genuine framework for protecting regional states.

Limits of the Security Function

The system rested on several implicit assumptions: that American military superiority could deter any threat, that conflicts and revolutionary movements could be geographically contained, and that Gulf states could remain passive recipients of protection without developing substantial independent security capabilities. These assumptions formed the foundation of the region’s security architecture.

However, these same foundations carried structural vulnerabilities. Security became dependent on a single external actor, making stability contingent on that actor’s will and capacity. Long-term reliance weakened the Gulf states’ ability to handle complex and evolving threats independently. Meanwhile, the system failed to account for shifts in conflict dynamics—from direct military confrontation to targeting critical economic infrastructure, including energy, shipping routes, and supply chains.

As a result, the system’s stability was more apparent than real, sustained by postponing its internal contradictions until these became evident amid changing and increasingly complex conflict conditions.

Declining Capacity to Perform the Security Function

Recent developments reveal that the Gulf security system can no longer guarantee uninterrupted energy flows—its core function. The problem is no longer limited to the level of protection or the efficiency of its tools, but lies in the evolving nature of threats, which now target key nodes within the economic structure itself, including production facilities, maritime routes, and export logistics.

Traditional deterrence tools have lost effectiveness because these threats do not require overwhelming military superiority. Instead, they exploit vulnerabilities within sensitive economic networks, where disruption of a single node can produce far-reaching effects beyond its immediate geography. This shift has moved the center of gravity from military confrontation to the susceptibility of economic systems, reducing the effectiveness of existing defense frameworks.

At the same time, America is is no longer able to provide comprehensive guarantees as before—not due to a simple decline in power, but because of the rising cost of protecting an interconnected global system. Any large-scale escalation carries economic repercussions affecting all parties, including the system’s core. Security and economics have thus become inseparable, making the management of flows more complex than merely protecting them through military force.

The Gulf Security Dilemma

The declining effectiveness of the security system has placed Gulf states in a complex predicament. They cannot abandon the American security guarantee, which remains central to their defense structure, yet they can no longer rely on it as fully as before. This contradiction stems from their position within the global system: their internal stability depends on continuous energy flows, yet these flows themselves have become vulnerable.

Security is no longer confined to military considerations. It now encompasses continuity of production and export, market stability, and avoiding transformation of national territories into open conflict zones. Maintaining economic function has become integral to the concept of security itself.

In response, Gulf policies are shifting toward reducing dependency rather than achieving full military independence. The focus has moved to managing risks and mitigating their effects rather than eliminating them entirely—marking a transition from decisive control to adaptive strategies in an increasingly uncertain environment.

Regional Transformation and Emerging Actors

The weakening of centralized control has altered the regional landscape. The Gulf is no longer dominated by a single actor capable of directing outcomes, but has become a space where influence is distributed among multiple players. Regional powers—particularly Iran—have developed capabilities to affect vital routes and energy-related economic infrastructure, limiting any external actor’s ability to impose total control or ensure sustained stability.

This shift does not indicate the emergence of a new hegemon, but rather a reconfiguration of power in which the capacity for disruption becomes a central factor. The result is a more complex and less controllable security environment, shaped by overlapping interests and multiple centers of influence.

Seeking Complementary Security Options

In response, Gulf states have expanded their security options—not to replace America as the primary guarantor, but to reduce reliance on a single actor. This includes deepening relations with other global powers, particularly in economic and technological domains, maintaining communication channels with regional actors to reduce escalation risks, and developing limited domestic defense capabilities, especially in air defense and infrastructure protection.

However, these measures remain complementary. The military and economic structures of Gulf states are still tied to the Western system, constraining any move toward full independence. This approach reflects an attempt to redistribute risks within the existing system rather than exit it or fundamentally transform it.

Transformations in a Multipolar Context

These developments coincide with broader changes in the international system. While dominance is no longer as concentrated as in the post-Cold War era, it has not fragmented enough to produce a stable alternative order. Control capabilities are declining without the disappearance of the system’s central core, creating a transitional phase where continuity coexists with transformation.

Emerging global powers have gained influence through economic and trade expansion and extensive networks of relations. Yet they avoid fully assuming the burdens of global security, whether in military costs or long-term strategic commitments. Their role remains focused on benefiting from and expanding within the existing system rather than rebuilding it.

This results in an unstable form of multipolarity, where influence is distributed but no alternative center emerges to impose stable rules. The global economic structure remains intact, with interconnected markets and flows, while competition intensifies in the absence of decisive regulatory mechanisms.

Diversifying relations does not lead to true strategic independence, as it occurs within the same global framework that defines its limits. Instead, it redistributes dependency among multiple actors, expanding room for maneuver without altering structural positioning. Foreign policy thus becomes a tool for managing one’s place within a complex system rather than escaping it.

General Direction

Current indicators suggest that the Gulf security system is shifting from controlling energy flows to managing their disruption. This reflects the declining ability of the dominant actor to provide comprehensive guarantees, alongside the rise of regional capabilities capable of influencing critical economic infrastructure.

The Gulf security dilemma deepens as states remain tied to America while attempting to reduce dependence through diversification—without achieving full independence. At the same time, an unstable multipolarity is taking shape, redistributing roles within the existing system rather than replacing it.

As a result, the region is not moving toward a stable new security order, but toward a model based on continuous adaptation, where security becomes an ongoing process of risk management rather than a condition of resolution.

Conclusion

Current transformations reveal that while the Gulf security system remains relevant as a framework for organizing security relations, it has lost its ability to perform its original function—ensuring stability through centralized control. It can no longer prevent disruptions and has instead become part of a broader system that manages prolonged instability.

Within this reality, Gulf states operate within a limited margin, balancing global system requirements with regional pressures. They seek to expand their tools without fundamentally altering their structural position, making the future of security in the region dependent on adaptability rather than decisive control.