Report | Ali Al-Darwani

​Saudi Arabia embarked on its aggressive and unjust war against Yemen under the illusion that its military arsenal, Western support, and massive financial expenditure would be sufficient to swiftly decide the battle and achieve its objectives in a short period. It ignored the resilience of the Yemeni people, whose history proves that their will cannot be broken. More critically, Riyadh—having suffered twelve years of failure against a Yemen that trusts and relies upon Allah—has failed to draw lessons from the bitter experiences of over a decade, nor from the resounding blows dealt to the superpowers, foremost among them the United States, in the Red Sea theater of operations.

 

​American Recognition of Yemeni Lessons

​In major shifts throughout military history, it is rare for dominant superpowers to admit that they are receiving field lessons from adversaries fighting them with resources that are, on the surface, vastly asymmetrical. However, the events in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait during Yemen’s support for Gaza—under the operations of the "Promised Conquest and Sacred Jihad"—shattered this rule.

​At that time, American military leaders and defense strategy researchers in the United States explicitly and unequivocally acknowledged that the Pentagon is deeply studying and practically benefiting from the expertise and tactics of confrontation employed by the Yemeni Armed Forces. This admission went beyond mere passing description, becoming a tacit acknowledgment of a fundamental shift in the philosophy of modern warfare. Yemeni forces successfully combined field tactical flexibility with the maximum possible exploitation of available modern technology.

 

​The Pentagon: A Laboratory for Experiments

​The shock experienced by American and Western naval arsenals in the face of Yemeni military operations and tactics was no secret to observers of military affairs. For decades, Western military and combat doctrine has been built on the foundation of complex technological superiority and high-cost defense systems (such as stealth fighters, destroyers equipped with giant radars, and expensive interceptor missiles). This philosophy assumes that absolute qualitative superiority and the ability to strike from distant, safe positions guarantee absolute control, avoid direct human and material attrition, and ultimately secure decisive victory.

​However, the experience in the Red Sea proved to American experts that what is happening in Yemen represents a unique laboratory. U.S. officials and military personnel stated at the time—and subsequently—that the U.S. military is reviewing its training curricula and defense doctrine due to what they described as a disparity in cost and operational incompatibility. Multi-billion-dollar aircraft carriers and destroyers found themselves facing a complex combat equation managed with low-cost, high-effectiveness tools. This prompted the American military establishment to rethink its approach to electronic warfare, air defense, and the security of shipping lanes.

 

​Yemeni Tactics: The Ingenuity of Adapting the Available and Possible

​What provoked the admiration of impartial military analysts regarding Yemeni capabilities, alongside the scale of the impactful results, was the innovative methodology in resource management. When a force faces a prolonged blockade and limited technological capabilities compared to global arsenals, it did not surrender to helplessness. Instead, it sought to intelligently employ available technology, re-develop existing techniques, and integrate them in unexpected ways to serve strategic objectives just as precise as classical systems.

​Yemeni forces transformed a missile from a mere projectile launched toward a fixed land target into a ballistic missile possessing autonomous tracking capabilities and the ability to engage moving maritime targets on the high seas at ultra-high speeds. On the other hand, they integrated electro-optical guidance systems and locally developed sensors, creating a highly accurate naval offensive weapon at a very minimal cost compared to classical naval systems. This forced major naval destroyers to struggle to cope with a missile combining ballistic speed and direct guidance onto moving targets.

​All of this occurred under hostile air and intelligence dominance, reflecting an unyielding combat doctrine impervious to infrastructure strikes. The Yemeni Armed Forces demonstrated a high capacity for maneuver and battle management under such dominance, innovating engagement paths, imposing entirely new rules of engagement, and turning open maritime areas into narrow spaces for fleets considered the strongest in the world.

 

​Strategic Dimensions and Implications: The End of the Era of Absolute Superiority

​Reviewing those American statements and admissions reveals profound implications that extend beyond the boundaries of that crisis to the future of global security and modern warfare. This includes shattering the myth of technological immunity, as Yemeni tactics proved that absolute material and technical superiority alone is not sufficient to resolve conflicts or provide total immunity, and that will and tactical intelligence are capable of forging a qualitative deterrence balance.

​Relatedly, the major dilemma acknowledged by the Pentagon is the enormous cost of American interceptor missiles compared to the negligible cost of the offensive means used by Yemen—a mathematical and economic equation that threatens to exhaust any superpower in the long run. This has contributed significantly to shifting the balance of power in enclosed seas and cementing new realities on the ground, confirming that the protection of international trade cannot be achieved through unilateral hegemony, but rather through respecting the sovereignty of nations and accommodating new regional balances.

 

​Saudi Arabia and the American Lesson

​When the Pentagon acknowledged that it is learning and modifying its naval defense doctrine, it sent an indirect message to Riyadh: "If we, the strongest globally, are reconsidering our tactics and facing a strategic dilemma, we will not be able to provide an integrated and effective protection umbrella for anyone." This reality compels the leadership of the Al Saud criminal regime to absorb these realities—that superficial armaments superiority is no longer sufficient, and that absolute reliance on American protection in the seas and straits has become a bet on an umbrella that sews itself back together during a storm.

​Thus, Saudi Arabia finds itself today facing the American lesson from the standpoint of one who realized its miscalculation too late. Although American statements may not have explicitly pointed to the gravity and evolution of Yemeni tactics, they implicitly justified the prior exposure of the Saudi interior. They confirmed to everyone that the ability of Yemeni forces to reconcile the available and the possible, along with rapid development, has imposed a new deterrence equation that cannot be bypassed in Washington, let alone Riyadh.

​Does Riyadh delude itself into thinking it is more powerful and capable than Washington? Furthermore, how can it gamble on achieving what the world's primary superpower failed to accomplish? If the Pentagon is learning from Yemeni tactics, what is the Saudi leadership waiting for to absorb the lesson? Does Riyadh not realize that continuing the war is a drain on its energy and a chase after mirages? Does Saudi Arabia believe that purchasing more weapons will compensate for the absence of vision and the collapse of combat doctrine? Does Riyadh not know that shedding innocent blood destroys power and reduces the impact of weapons to zero? Does it not realize that injustice and aggression are the primary gateways to defeat and setback? How can massive military equipment protect an aggressor facing a people fighting with unyielding will and faith? Has the time not come for Saudi Arabia to realize that the American umbrella of protection has become hollow and offers no shelter from storms? How long will this adventure continue, and what is Riyadh reaping other than disillusionment and strategic exposure?