Ansarollah Website Official Report | Hashem Abu Taleb

The story of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea has moved far beyond being a passing episode in the record of American naval operations in the “Middle East,” becoming instead a symbol of U.S. failure. 

Official reports and investigations released by the U.S. Navy on December 4, 2025, and published on the website of the U.S. Naval Institute News, addressing four separate incidents between December 2024 and May 2025, have revealed a reality starkly different from the narrative Washington sought to promote throughout two years of open warfare against Yemen.

The narrative is no longer about a superpower advancing into the Red Sea to reassert dominance, as Washington claims. The daily strikes carried out by the carrier and its air wing can no longer be portrayed as acts of naval supremacy. 

Instead, the investigations themselves present a record of disruption, pressure, breakdowns, systemic erosion, and human strain—conditions the U.S. Navy has not experienced on this scale since the disasters of the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain in 2017.

Thus, through the pens of senior U.S. Navy officers—Admiral Kaveh Hakimzadeh, Admiral Todd Willen, Vice Admiral John Gambleton, and Marine Major General Sean Bailey—the investigation documents have become a testimony revealing that Yemen, with its ballistic weapons, anti-ship capabilities, and attack drones, pushed one of the largest U.S. aircraft carriers to the brink of collapse.

Exposing the Cracks in American Military Technology

The U.S. investigation was saturated with language that unmistakably reflected the scale of American failure: references to “four major incidents,” and one recurring reality throughout the period—the U.S. Navy lost three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets (one as a result of friendly fire, and two due to mechanical and organizational breakdowns). 

The aircraft carrier also collided with a commercial vessel near Port Said, suffered a collapse in its flight-deck aircraft arresting system, and endured 52 consecutive days of combat pressure during an operation the Navy labeled “Rough Rider.”

The most damning line, repeated across every investigation, was blunt and unequivocal: “This incident could have been prevented.” The central question, however, remains—why were these incidents not prevented, and why did failure recur across four separate events?

The answer surfaces repeatedly at the end of each investigation and throughout the testimonies: crushing operational pressure generated by the war with Yemen, not isolated human error, was the decisive factor that dismantled the cohesion of the American naval formation.

According to the report, on December 22, the cruiser USS Gettysburg shot down one of the carrier’s own aircraft—an incident that stands as the most symbolic and revealing evidence of the fragility of U.S. performance in the Red Sea. 

In the early hours of December 22, 2024, following a prolonged day of U.S. airstrikes on Yemen, the carrier strike group faced what the report described as an earlier-than-anticipated Yemeni response: suicide drones and anti-ship missiles that forced a surge in air-defense sorties from six to fourteen within just four hours. 

These figures clearly demonstrate that the Yemeni military had imposed a state of constant, exhausting alert on the U.S. Navy.

At this critical juncture, USS Gettysburg was assigned the role of air-defense commander. Yet the investigation reveals a stark reality: the cruiser was never fully integrated into the carrier strike group. Of the 45 days preceding the incident, it had operated alongside the group for only seven days. 

A planned ten-day integration exercise was abruptly reduced to two days; Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems were either disabled or switched off; and the crew lacked awareness of the strike plan and aircraft recovery timelines.

At 1:40 a.m., the cruiser launched two SM-2 missiles at two U.S. Super Hornets, mistakenly identifying them as hostile cruise missiles. One aircraft was shot down after its crew ejected, while the second narrowly survived through what investigators described as an extraordinary evasive maneuver.

Investigators concluded that the incident could have been prevented through proper planning and timely execution. Yet the broader reality is far more damning: the very shortcomings of the aircraft carrier that Washington had relied upon as a pillar of its power constitute a profound failure in themselves—one that exposes structural and technological weaknesses within the U.S. Navy. 

These vulnerabilities were laid bare by the intensity and precision of Yemeni missile and drone operations, which subjected the naval formation to relentless pressure and forced its weaknesses into the open.

Significantly, in the aftermath of the incident, the U.S. Navy spent more than $55 million modifying the software of the Aegis combat system to ensure the mistake would not be repeated—an implicit admission of a serious and deeply rooted technological flaw.

Fear of Yemen Undermines U.S. Sailors’ Focus

The report documents the second major failure involving the U.S. aircraft carrier, detailing a collision that occurred on February 12 near Port Said. 

According to the investigation, less than two months after the friendly-fire shootdown of a U.S. aircraft, USS Harry S. Truman was transiting toward the Suez Canal at a speed of 19 knots, without broadcasting its AIS signal, and under only indirect supervision from its commander, who had left the bridge one hour before the critical approach.

The investigation described the incident as a combination of poor navigational skill, abdication of responsibility, insufficient training, and weak bridge communication. 

However, it later emphasized that these failures were deeply influenced by the psychological impact and state of fear following confrontations with the Yemeni military. 

The report confirms that the carrier collided with the commercial vessel MV Besiktas-M, and that—were it not for a last-second order of “hard right rudder”—the collision could have resulted in the deaths of 120 sailors who were asleep beneath the potential impact zone.

According to the report, Captain Dave Snowden left the bridge approximately one hour before the collision, entrusting navigation to the helmsman and navigator, in violation of naval regulations that require direct command oversight when approaching a critical passage such as the Suez Canal. 

The investigation states that Snowden “abdicated responsibility for safe navigation,” while the navigator likewise “relinquished responsibility,” even as the vessel entered a densely trafficked area. On the bridge, communication breakdowns prevailed: inaccurate deck logs, hesitation in reporting risks, and a misjudgment of the commercial tanker’s course.

Two minutes before impact, the commander was summoned back to the bridge. One minute later, an order for “hard left rudder” was issued, followed immediately by Snowden’s counter-order of “hard right rudder” once it became clear the collision was unavoidable. 

This maneuver reduced the angle of impact, delayed the moment of collision, and—according to the report—prevented “more severe damage and potential loss of life.”

Although the damage was limited to a breach above the waterline and scraping near the aft sponson of the starboard elevator, with repair costs estimated at $685,000, the investigation explicitly compares the incident to the 2017 disasters involving the destroyers USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain. 

It includes a stark conclusion worth pausing over: “The difference between life and death was a matter of a few feet or a few seconds.” Had the collision occurred just 100 feet forward, the impact would have penetrated a sleeping compartment housing 120 sailors. Had the third aircraft elevator been in the lowered position, “USS Harry S. Truman would have suffered significant degradation of flight-deck operations.”

More critical than the material damage, the investigation returns to the human environment aboard the carrier. Department heads described a culture of “just get the mission done,” marked by exhaustion, sleep deprivation, and relentless pressure to complete tasks at any cost. 

When a senior naval official was asked about the similarity between these findings and those of 2017, he did not deny it, stating: “We have 18,000 gaps at sea,” an admission that severe personnel shortages have become a structural reality of naval operations—even as leadership continues to insist that ships are deployed only when they are “fully manned, trained, and equipped.”

Failure in Command and Maintenance

The report did not merely expose technical flaws; it also laid bare serious deficiencies in leadership, preparedness, and maintenance. It presented a third case study of U.S. failure in the Red Sea confrontation, dated 18 April, when a Yemeni missile caused the loss of an aircraft without ever striking it directly. Yemen did not need to hit the carrier itself; the defensive maneuver alone was enough to bring the aircraft down.

According to the report, on 18 April the bridge announced the approach of a Yemeni medium-range ballistic missile. Orders were issued for the carrier to accelerate to 30 knots, turn sharply to starboard, and execute a standard evasive maneuver. However, in Hangar Bay 3, the aircraft assigned for towing had its chocks and securing chains removed at precisely the wrong moment. The carrier’s sudden 15-degree list caused both the fighter jet and the towing vehicle to roll toward the edge and plunge into the sea.

The investigation, led by Captain Douglas Ivanak, concluded that the primary cause was a failure to comply with established procedures and operational standards, compounded by a possible brake system malfunction and weak communication between the bridge and hangar teams. The breakdown was so severe that both Flight Deck Control and Hangar Control either did not hear or did not trust the bridge’s announcement of the maneuver.

In his final endorsement, Vice Admiral John Gumbleton wrote with striking clarity that the loss of the aircraft “would have occurred even if the deck surface had not been slippery and the tires had been new,” stressing that the decisive factors were the removal of restraints at an unsafe moment and the absence of adequate coordination prior to executing the maneuver.

In sum, a Yemeni missile forced the carrier into evasive action—but the evasion itself became the direct cause of losing an aircraft worth tens of millions of dollars. Basic safety procedures were ignored, and the operational pressure of sustained combat rendered coordination between the bridge and the hangar fragile and ineffective.

A Small Metal Part Halts U.S. Progress

The fourth case of U.S. failure highlighted in the report involved nothing more than a tiny metal piece, yet it was enough to bring down an American aircraft. According to the report, the incident occurred on 6 May: a missing washer caused a $60 million F/A-18F jet to fall into the sea. At the time, the USS Harry S. Truman was on its 52nd day of continuous air operations. 

That night, the aircraft hook engaged the fourth arresting wire as intended, but the system collapsed catastrophically. The crosshead entered the damping room, spun violently “like the Tasmanian Devil,” as the report described. 

The root of the problem was a small metal washer that had not been installed in its designated position, allowing the pin to gradually shift, eventually break, and trigger a total system failure, causing the aircraft to plunge into the sea.

Witnesses on the flight deck heard a loud bang and saw sparks and flames as the jet slid off the deck edge before the crew ejected safely into the water. 

Below, in Arresting Gear Room 4, operators heard a strong explosion and saw the hydraulic crosshead shoot out of the cylinder, spinning “like the Tasmanian Devil,” before striking the pressure manifold panel. 

The operator who had prematurely opened the safety cage contrary to procedures sustained a minor neck injury, and his headset was ripped off.

The technical investigation concluded that the direct cause was the missing washer, which should have been positioned between the threaded nut and the pin at a critical point of the arresting gear. 

Its absence allowed the pin to gradually move out of place and eventually break days or weeks before the incident, leading to complete system failure and the inability to absorb the aircraft’s landing energy. 

Worse, this flaw went undetected despite maintenance work on 5 May and pre-operational checks on the day of the accident, even though the damping system indicator flashed yellow and green—“ready/not ready”—but the operator responsible for declaring a “Foul Deck” attempted to “experiment” instead of halting the landing, as procedures demanded.

From a human and organizational perspective, the report noted that the Arresting Gear (V2) section had only 34 sailors, including ten temporarily assigned, instead of the fifty required at the start of deployment. Only one of three quality assurance positions was filled, and the QA supervisor did not properly monitor or review technician training.

In his endorsement of the investigation, Marine Brigadier General Sean Bailey wrote a telling statement: “This entire incident could have been prevented if the captain and the flight deck team aboard USS Harry S. Truman had simply complied with the Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment Maintenance Program (ALREMP) requirements.

The harsh reality is that multiple individuals across different leadership levels allowed the ALRE maintenance program to deteriorate to total failure.” 

The final toll: a $60 million aircraft at the bottom of the sea, more than $207,000 in arresting gear and engine repairs, and minor injuries among the crew.

Yemen’s Victory Testified

From a military and political perspective, the U.S. investigations effectively became a written testimony to Yemen’s triumph. When the four incidents are considered together, a clear pattern emerges that requires little interpretation:

First: Yemen imposed a new equation in the Red Sea. Its ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones forced the carrier to double its air defense sorties, execute emergency maneuvers, and alter attack plans while operating in a high-tempo environment for 52 consecutive days. The carrier was no longer an untouchable force but a hunted, pressured, and exhausted asset.

Second: The Yemeni pressure revealed structural flaws in the U.S. Navy. The reports highlighted a shortage of 18,000 sailors, deteriorating maintenance programs, operational stress depriving crews of sleep, breakdowns in coordination between the bridge and hangar, and the compression of ten-day integration training into just two days. 

Malfunctions in the IFF system and weak unit integration further exposed vulnerabilities. Each incident reflected and magnified the strain imposed by Yemen, revealing the fragile backbone of U.S. naval operations.

Third: The true cost to the U.S. went beyond missiles. Losses were not limited to the value of aircraft or repairs but included the exposure of systemic weaknesses, damage to the carrier’s reputation, and the perception that the U.S. was more fatigued than cohesive. 

The Navy was forced to overhaul entire programs (Aegis, ALRE), shaking internal confidence. Through unconventional capabilities, Yemen achieved what even major powers historically could not accomplish against aircraft carriers, compelling written acknowledgment that U.S. forces faltered under its pressure.

In Conclusion

When the Americans write their confessions, Yemen writes its victory. Yemen did not need to sink the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman, nor strike its tower or runway. It achieved something deeper by forcing the U.S. Navy to draft a document of acknowledgment with its own hand.

These investigations show that a carrier lost two fighter jets due to missing metal parts and degraded procedures, that a cruiser shot down a friendly aircraft because it could not withstand the pressure of Yemeni missiles, and that the carrier collided with a commercial vessel in an incident reminiscent of the 2017 disaster. A Yemeni ballistic strike even caused a plane to fall from the hangar without a direct missile hit.

In this way, the investigations serve as mandatory testimony that Yemen did not merely engage in a harassment campaign against the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea; it entered the conflict as a strategic player capable of altering a decades-old engagement equation. 

The Harry S. Truman entered the Red Sea as a symbol of dominance and emerged weighed down with official documents depicting fear, exhaustion, confusion, communication breakdowns, and repeated losses—not solely at the hands of the adversary, but also by its own hand.

Thus, without any propaganda and without raising its voice, the U.S. investigations say enough: Yemen has triumphed on the battlefield and on paper, in the clash and in the narrative, in the skies and on the pages of the investigations themselves.