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The sea is no longer—as Western powers have assumed for decades—an open arena for secure dominance, or a domain governed solely by technological superiority. With the escalation of confrontations in the Red Sea, a new reality has emerged, imposed by unexpected field equations that have exposed the limitations of traditional naval power and redefined the concept of control in maritime environments. In this context, the fourth Paris Naval Conference reflected a profound shift in Western military thinking. Unlike its predecessors, the conference's discussions were not focused on expanding influence or projecting power, but rather on absorbing the operational shock inflicted by the Yemeni armed forces and the resulting collapse of long-held assumptions in Western naval doctrine.
The Red Sea has transformed from a strategic shipping lane into a veritable laboratory for testing the balance of power, will, and tactics, making the conference a clear acknowledgment that the era of undisputed supremacy has ended. Since at least the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western navies, particularly the US Navy, have enjoyed complete freedom of action at sea, facing no real opposition. This has enabled them to project their influence globally, shaping their structures, organizations, and logistics to achieve this goal. However, with the emergence of the Yemeni armed forces, equipped with advanced weaponry and unwavering resolve, they now pose a new challenge. The ocean is no longer the safe haven it once was. The Yemeni Navy's achievements in supporting Gaza have created organizational, operational, and logistical implications, impacting the deployment of forces, the size of crews, and the organization and defense of rear bases.
In early February, the fourth Paris Conference was held, bringing together naval leaders from the US, UK, the Netherlands, Italy, and France. Instead of discussing ways to strengthen Western dominance at sea, the risks posed by the Yemeni Navy dominated the conference proceedings, which focused primarily on the need to capitalize on the fierce battles in the Red Sea. Western leaders agreed that Yemen’s operations in the Red Sea changed the concepts of naval warfare and forced Western powers to reassess their military doctrine, focusing on training under pressure, constant readiness, and dealing with asymmetric threats including drones and ballistic missiles.
The Red Sea Battle: A Lesson for Western Academies
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Darrell Cuddle, revealed that the "Golden Fleet" project is not limited to building new ships, but represents a comprehensive reimagining of the future of the U.S. Navy in light of the rapidly evolving nature of maritime threats worldwide. Cuddle explained that the new U.S. defense strategy prioritizes what he called "homeland protection" and the Western Hemisphere, noting that the new shipbuilding programs aim to adapt U.S. naval power to confront growing global threats, in cooperation with allies.
Speaking about the developments on the ground, Admiral Cuddle considered the Red Sea operations a "vital opportunity" to address one of the most complex naval missions, pointing out that the attacks on U.S. strike groups and destroyers by missiles and drones in the Red Sea were unprecedented since World War II.
He added that the operational system developed as a result of these confrontations has now become part of combat development centers in the United States, reflecting the significant lessons learned from that experience.
For his part, the French Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Nicolas Faugour, affirmed that Western naval forces are undergoing a phase that necessitates a reassessment of training methods and combat capability testing techniques, noting that what was observed in the Red Sea revealed a very wide range of threats.
Faugour explained that these threats were not limited to small drones, but also included larger drones, surface drones, as well as anti-ship and ballistic missiles, reflecting a fundamental shift in the nature of modern naval engagements.
For his part, Captain Jerome Henry, head of surface naval personnel training, explained that the French Navy is conducting new simulation exercises designed to place crews in increasingly stressful situations. Henry, who previously commanded the frigate Alsace and experienced repeated attacks in the Red Sea, emphasized that he is using his field experience to strengthen crews and prepare them for high-intensity combat.
Speaking to Defense News, Henry noted that extreme stress can cause individuals to lose some of their composure and lead to what is known as "narrowing of perspectives," adding that the challenge lies in how to prepare crews for such conditions. He explained that the training modifications include: raising heart rates through running or push-ups before entering the simulators; incorporating noise, smoke, and drone swarms; and deliberately malfunctioning weapons to increase sensory overload.
Henry indicated that he drew inspiration for these methods from French naval commando training and is seeking to benefit from the experiences of the US and Israeli forces in this area. He stressed that the goal is to raise tension levels “to the maximum extent possible” to ensure the right responses on the ground, noting that the experience in the Red Sea demonstrated the danger of losing control under pressure.
For his part, Admiral Harold Liebreijs, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy, emphasized that the most important lesson learned from the Red Sea is the necessity of constant readiness. He explained that the time for preparation after leaving port is over, and that everything must be realistic from the outset. He noted that Officer Paul Bieleveld, who commanded the support ship Karel Dorman during its deployment in the Red Sea, is now the naval training commander, tasked with passing on the lessons learned to the next generation
Captain Brian McIvor, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Warfare in the Royal Navy, acknowledged that Western navies lack experience in high-intensity combat. He noted that ship reductions and maintenance issues have impacted training levels and called for greater investment in combat training to maintain "combat spirit." He cited the longer gap between the Falklands War and World War II as an example of this, which has left forces less prepared.
He added that the Red Sea has represented a "rediscovery" of low-level threats, with a focus on small arms and multi-layered defenses, including jamming, light missiles, and laser-guided missiles. He explained that the annual "Wildfire" drone exercise focused on the risk of fire saturation and the potential for errors in a crowded environment.
The French Navy is also working to reduce radio emissions during exercises, relying on enemy emissions to build situational awareness, and decreasing its reliance on GPS by using inertial navigation and stargazing systems. Henry referred to “back to the 1980s” exercises that involve abandoning satellite communications and relying solely on HF and UHF radio, while being careful to economize on information exchange.
In the same vein, Captain Florian El-Ahdab, commander of the French frigate Languedoc, warned that cyber warfare could cripple naval forces “at the worst possible moment.” He emphasized that preparing for such eventualities requires drills simulating communication blackouts and reliance on traditional methods. He added that today’s sailors reflect the realities of contemporary society and may struggle to operate without modern tools, stressing that this challenge deserves serious exploration.
The Element of Surprise in the Red Sea Battle
Given the scale of the battle in the Red Sea and its repercussions, Western admissions are not surprising. The foolish powers—led by the United States—were the ones caught off guard by the complex battlefield reality imposed by the Yemeni army. This reality starkly contrasted with calculations based on technological superiority coupled with psychological warfare. For decades, the West has relied on its decisive technological advantage to guarantee victory in any naval confrontation. However, the events in the Red Sea exposed the fundamental flaws of Western technology in the face of low-cost, high-impact means that, in a short period, managed to overturn the situation and surpass those technologies. Consequently, Yemeni methods and tactics thwarted Western calculations, which had assumed they could decisively defeat the Yemeni army swiftly based on technological and technical superiority.
On the moral front, the Yemeni armed forces proved that technology alone does not decide the battle. War, fundamentally, is a battle of wills, which forced the West and the United States to reconsider their military doctrine at all levels—training, curricula, equipment, and capabilities—after encountering a different reality in the Red Sea.
What is striking in the confessions of Captain Brian McIvor, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Warfare in the British Royal Navy, is his admission that complete reliance on satellite communications was insufficient. He explained that this left Western forces exposed to Yemeni capabilities, as demonstrated during operations in the Red Sea. He indicated that this reflects the Yemeni army's advanced capabilities on two levels: first, intelligence, radar, and technological capabilities that enabled them to monitor satellite communications between ships and command centers, pinpoint their locations, and target them; and second, advanced technological capabilities in jamming and communications disruption. This raised Western concerns about communication breakdowns between warships and led some to suggest a return to the technologies and training methods of the 1980s.
The element of surprise, the optimal use of technology, rapid decision-making, and unprecedented boldness forced major powers—such as the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands, accustomed to controlling waterways and oceans—to acknowledge that they faced unprecedented threats in the Red Sea. These threats manifested in the sophistication of the equipment used, the intensity of operations, the sustained pressure, and the sophisticated surveillance, camouflage, and jamming tactics employed. Ultimately, these forces withdrew from the Red Sea region without achieving any gains.
The Western Navy Realizes Defeat in the Red Sea:
The achievements accumulated by the Yemeni Armed Forces have reinforced the perception of defeat in the Western military mindset. The pressure and psychological turmoil resulting from Yemeni operations have led to a firm conviction among Western naval commanders that any future return to this theater will be fraught with unforeseen risks and threats, with the element of surprise remaining a constant in any future confrontation. This is especially true given the Yemeni Armed Forces' remarkable progress in each naval operation compared to previous ones, as acknowledged by the US Navy, which previously admitted that the Yemeni army uses advanced weapons and missiles in every naval engagement. These admissions represent only the tip of the iceberg, as Western powers had believed that the tremendous technological advancements and the communications and information revolution had rendered geography a secondary factor, and that no areas were safe or inaccessible anymore.
It can be said that the Red Sea battle has restored geography to its rightful place as a key player in geopolitical theories and military strategies, proving that technological control alone is insufficient to impose hegemony, and that geography remains a decisive factor in the balance of power in conflict. This aspect was one of the surprises for the Yemeni army after it was able to target ships at long distances from mountainous areas far from the sea coasts.
Aircraft Carriers: From a Source of Strength to a Source of Weakness
In addition to the Yemeni technological and technical achievements, the aircraft carriers and massive naval forces, which represent a symbol of American power, have—by their own admission—transformed from a source of strength to a source of weakness, despite possessing advanced technologies. This is because Yemeni tactics and low-cost warfare methods have confounded these systems and imposed a new reality, even succeeding in imposing a naval blockade from the land. Consequently, the results of the Red Sea battle have transcended the framework of direct military confrontation, making Yemen a benchmark for evaluating military strategies. Statements from American naval leaders have acknowledged that what transpired has become a foundation upon which to build future training and strategic plans. This means that the challenges posed by Yemeni operations have gone beyond geopolitical theories, reaching the level of advanced technologies, training methods, and military strategies. This has forced the West to reassess the assumptions of absolute control upon which it has relied for decades, and the resulting material and moral costs.
In conclusion
The outcomes of the Paris Maritime Conference—with its direct and indirect acknowledgments—reveal that the Red Sea conflict represents a strategic shift that has fundamentally altered Western military thinking. Experience has demonstrated that technological superiority alone is insufficient to resolve conflicts, and that willpower, geography, and the ability to employ low-cost tools intelligently and boldly can undermine even the most complex naval systems. Furthermore, the Yemeni operations have reinforced the conviction among Western leaders that control of the seas is no longer a matter of superior weaponry, but rather a complex equation involving endurance, constant readiness, and the element of surprise. Thus, the Red Sea conflict has become a pivotal moment, redrawing the boundaries of naval power and forcing the West to reassess its naval doctrine and prestige in a world where the seas are no longer a guaranteed arena for dominance.
